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I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 2005, the New York Times first reported that
President George W. Bush had secretly authorized the National Security
Agency ("NSA") to conduct warrantless domestic surveillance in an effort
to combat terrorism.I Almost immediately, the story ignited controversy
and national debate over the program and whether it violated any of a
number of statutes, orders, and federal court decisions which make up the
U.S. foreign intelligence legal regime. This Note discusses this regime and
the capabilities of the agencies which operate under its purview.
Part II gives an outline of the regime and the context in which it
developed. Particular emphasis is given to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") and the enigmatic court which interprets it. Part
III describes the Echelon Interception System and the manner in which the
United States gathers and shares foreign signals intelligence. Part III then
goes on to discuss the implications of intelligence sharing and concludes
that some aspects of the current practice are incompatible with the
principles, if not the jurisprudence, of the Fourth Amendment.
This Note does not seek to argue that the type and degree of foreign
intelligence surveillance currently being undertaken by the federal
government is illegal, oppressive, or unwise. Rather, it seeks to point out
how technological advancements have rendered America's foreign
intelligence legal regime irrelevant by causing a massive disconnect
between its goals and its real world impact.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE LAW
A. Pre-FISA
Presidents going back as far as Abraham Lincoln have claimed that
the Constitution confers upon their office the "inherent authority" to
conduct warrantless surveillance for the purposes of national security and
foreign affairs.2 Beginning most notably with the Roosevelt administration,
"presidents have claimed the right to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance in matters involving the defense of the nation, with each
successive administration continuing to broaden this amorphous 'national
security exception' to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 3
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at 1.
2. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1264, 1270 (2004).
3. John J. Dvorske, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelligence
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In an effort to clarify Executive authority, Congress enacted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III"). 4 Title
III was the first piece of legislation to require the President to obtain a court
order before conducting electronic surveillance. 5 The statute sought to
distinguish criminal from foreign surveillance, and in fact began with an
explicit disclaimer stating:
Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack ... of a foreign
power, [or] to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States :...
Title III thus validated presidential authority to conduct warrantless
surveillance for the purposes of national security, but it did not consider
any applicable limits to such authority.
The unchecked and expansive power over surveillance granted to the
President under Title III led inevitably to its exploitation. Media
investigations of the 1960s and 1970s alarmed Americans by uncovering
numerous incidents of abuse by a government that seemed to have become
fundamentally unconcerned with many of the civil liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution. 7 The CIA and FBI's illegal "Cointelpro" and "Chaos"
Operations, which tried to publicly discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other civil rights leaders; the clandestine surveillance and harassment
of Vietnam War protestors; and the "black bag" burglary of Democratic
Party campaign strategies by White House "plumbers" are but a few of the
episodes which served to undermine public trust in the government and
elucidate the need for reform.
8
Concurrently, the Supreme Court limited the President's national
security exception for the first time when it handed down its decision in
United States v. United States District Court ("Keith").9 In Keith, the Court
was required to determine whether the President had the power "to
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. C.A. §§ 1801 et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance
of Foreign Powers and Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. FED. 385, 395 (Supp. 2005).
4. See Ellen S. Podger & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-
Client Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHics 145, 150 (2003). See also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (2000).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
6. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 214 (1968).
7. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1317-19 (2004).
8. See id.
9. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The case is named after Damon Keith, the District Court judge
who initially ordered the government to disclose information it obtained via electronic
surveillance.
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authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior
judicial approval."' 10 Despite a longstanding history of such surveillance,
the Court determined that the President did not have this authority."l In the
majority opinion, Justice Powell reasoned that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
contemplates a prior judicial judgment, ' 12 and although the task of
ensuring national security presented special circumstances, "[t]he
circumstances described do not justify complete exemption of domestic
security surveillance from prior judicial scrutiny."'13 The Keith decision,
combined with the widespread domestic unrest generated by Watergate and
related government scandals, prompted Congress to form the Senate Select
Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities. The subcommittee was chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church
and is commonly referred to as the "Church Committee."' 14 The Church
Committee was tasked with investigating the alleged intelligence abuses by
the FBI and other agencies and furnishing its report and recommendations
to Congress. 15 In its report to Congress, the Church Committee concluded
that:
[I]ntelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded
the restraints on the exercise of governmental power whil are
imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions... . Too
many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies
and [too] much information has [been] collected. The Government has
often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their
political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or
illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.17
According to the Committee, a necessary step towards curtailment of
unconstitutional surveillance practices was to require that the government
agencies which conduct surveillance do so in either the foreign or domestic
realm. 18 The Committee's recommendations reflected the Supreme Court's
language in Keith, in which the Court predicted that divergent statutory
requirements for foreign and domestic surveillance may be necessary under
10. Id. at 299.
11. Id. at 320.
12. Id. at 317.
13. Id. at 320.
14. Solove, supra note 2, at 1276.
15. See The Assassination Archives and Research Center, http://www.aarclibrary.orgi
publib/church/reports/contents.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
16. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. SENATE, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 2 (1976), available at http://www.aarclibrary.
org/publib/church/reports/book2/html/ChurchB2_0001 a.htm.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 293-94.
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the Fourth Amendment. 19 It was Congress' acceptance of this conclusion
that prompted them to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in
1978.20
B. FISA
The legislative purpose in enacting FISA was to create, in the eyes of
the law, distinct and mutually exclusive foreign and domestic spheres of
surveillance and to provide a statutory framework for government conduct
in the foreign sphere. 2 1 FISA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act,
22
remains in place today and provides authorization for the government to
conduct surveillance of a "foreign power" and an "agent of a foreign
power" for the purpose of gathering "foreign intelligence information. '
Originally limited to electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping, its scope
was later expanded in 1994 to permit covert physical intrusions with what
have been dubbed "sneak and peek" warrants. The combined scope of
FISA and Title III theoretically addresses every instance in which the
government may lawfully conduct electronic surveillance of any kind.
25
In order to obtain a FISA warrant, the Attorney General must submit
an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), an
Article III special court created under the FISA statute.26 The request must
detail: (1) the identity of the target; (2) a certification that the target is a
"foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power"; (3) the type of
surveillance to be used; and (4) certification that the information sought is
19. For instance, the Court commented, "There is no reason to believe that federal
judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security
cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different
considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime."' Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
20. 50U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000).
21. See Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot Act's Impact on the Government's Ability to
Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DuKE L.J. 179,
190 (2002).
22. USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for the Act's full title: The Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections throughout 18 U.S.C.).
23. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(1), 1805(a)(3)(A).
24. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1822.
25. Some commentators, including those in the Bush Administration, continue to argue
that presidential authority to conduct surveillance for the purpose of national security is
derived directly from the Constitution and is not limited by either Title III or FISA.
Congress appears to have rejected this contention, asserting that FISA and the criminal
warrant procedures constitute the "exclusive means" by which government may conduct
surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. III 2000).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000).
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for the purposes of foreign intelligence. 27 In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act
amended FISA's foreign intelligence purpose requirement, lowering the
standard from "primary purpose" to "significant purpose."
28
In addition to court-ordered surveillance, FISA permits the President
to authorize electronic surveillance without a court order for a period of up
to one year, provided the Department of Justice ("DOJ") certifies that the
surveillance is: (1) only for foreign intelligence information; (2) targets
only foreign powers or their agents; and (3) there is no substantial
likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any
communication to which a United States person is a party.29 In each of
those cases, the Attorney General is required to certify compliance with
those conditions to the FISC.30 In addition, the Attorney General is
required to provide a semiannual report on the use of surveillance under
overall compliance to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence as well as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
detailing the extent of surveillance being conducted without a court order.
31
Under the statute, a U.S. person can be classified as an "agent of a
foreign power" upon a finding that he or she acts for a foreign power, is or
may be involved in espionage for a foreign power, or is involved in
international terrorism. An important caveat to this definition is that no
U.S. person can be classified as an agent of a foreign power based solely on
his participation in activities protected by the First Amendment.
33
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,333 as part of
an effort to reorganize the U.S. intelligence refime and clarify its mission
in response to emerging threats of terrorism. The Order established the
first procedures for conducting electronic surveillance outside of the U.S.
and mandated that all intelligence collection must be done in a manner
"consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the
principles upon which the United States was founded." 35 Specifically, this
meant that federal agencies were not permitted to conduct foreign
27. Id. § 1804(a)(1)-(1 1).
28. Jennifer L. Sullivan, Note, From "The Purpose" to "A Significant Purpose":
Assessing the Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the
Fourth Amendment, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 379, 381 (2005). See USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 280 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. III 2000)).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000).
30. Id. § 1802(a)(2).
31. Id. § 1808(a).
32. See id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
33. Id.
34. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2000).
35. Id. atpt. 2.1.
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intelligence operations for the purpose of collecting information about the
domestic activities of U.S. persons.36 In addition, the government would be
required to use the least intrusive collection techniques available when
conducting surveillance on U.S. persons abroad.
37
Executive Order 12,333 was also the first directive to establish the
National Security Agency ("NSA") as the primary agency responsible for
collecting and disseminating signals intelligence information in support of
U.S. military operations and foreign policy.38 The Order permits the NSA
to disseminate signals intelligence only to authorized government
recipients, and it strictly forbids the sharing of foreign intelligence with
private U.S. corporations.3 9 Finally, President Reagan's Order prohibits the
NSA from tasking foreign agencies or private entities to engage in
activities forbidden by the Executive Order on its behalf.
40
FISA and Executive Order 12,333 combine to create an extremely
complex legal framework. The rules within this framework can vary widely
depending on the identity of the target and the location of the surveillance.
However (and at the risk of oversimplifying), the interaction of FISA and
Executive Order 12,333 can be summarized as follows: (1) if the
surveillance is occurring inside the U.S., FISA controls; (2) if the
surveillance is occurring outside the U.S. and the target is a U.S. person,
Executive Order 12,333 controls; and (3) if the surveillance is occurring
outside of the U.S. and the target is not a U.S. person, there are no
restrictions, and the agency is free to conduct surveillance as it wishes.
41
C. FISC
Not surprisingly, the definitions provided in the FISA statute are a
source of concern for civil libertarians. Section 1801(a) defines a "foreign
power" first as "a foreign government or a component thereof, whether or
not recognized by the United States;" and second as "a faction of a foreign
nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons.;42
Here, there is a notable ambiguity as to exactly what "substantially" means
and how many non-U.S. persons would need to be part of a particular
group before the government is permitted to spy on it. Also included in the
definition of foreign powers is any "entity that is directed and controlled by
36. Id. at pt. 2.3(b).
37. Id. at pt. 2.4.
38. Id. atpt. 1.12(b).
39. Id. at pt. 2.3.
40. Id. at pt. 2.4.
41. Technically, Executive Order 12,333 still controls, but it only requires that
surveillance be conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the head of the
agency.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
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a foreign government or governments. ' 43 This definition suffers from a
similar ambiguity, leaving unclear how much control a foreign government
must have over an "entity"-a foreign based corporation for example-
before the NSA is permitted to gather intelligence on the group and its
members or employees.
The FISC is the primary court charged with resolving such
ambiguities in FISA. However, confusion over the meaning of much of
FISA's language still remains after nearly thirty years, due largely to the
fact that very little is known about how the FISC interprets the statute. In
fact, very little is known about the court at all. However, the modest
amount of information that is known about the FISC and its procedures has
privacy advocates particularly concerned.
Although its membership is made public, the FISC's proceedings and
judgments are highly classified.44 It is known that the FISC meets in a
"secret windowless courtroom, sealed from the public by cipher-locked
doors on the top floor of the Department of Justice. '45 Proceedings are
nonadversarial and entirely ex parte.46 DOJ attorneys have exclusive access
to the FISC judges to present evidence and argue for FISA warrants.47
When reviewing a FISA application, the presiding judge is explicitly
forbidden from second-guessing or otherwise scrutinizing any factual
allegation made by the government. 4 If the warrant request is denied, the
government can appeal to a three judge Janel termed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. In reality, however, the
government's option to appeal is essentially superfluous; in the time since
its inception, the FISC has approved 20,605 surveillance applications and
denied seven. 5 Conversely, no target of a FISA warrant, U.S. citizen or
43. Id. at § 1801(aX6).
44. Patrick S. Poole, Inside America's Secret Court: The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, Jan. 22, 2005, http://www.apfin.net/Messageboard/01 -24-05/discussion.c
gi.54.html. See also Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog To
Lapdog?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 249, 251 (2002).
45. See Poole, supra note 44.
46. Lawrence D. Sloan, Echelon and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A
Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1496 (2001).
47. See Poole, supra note 44.
48. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984). The court explained:
The FISA Judge, in reviewing the application, is not to second-guess the executive
branch official's certification .... Further, Congress intended that, when a person
affected by a FISA surveillance challenges the FISA Court's order, a reviewing
court is to have no greater authority to second-guess the executive branch's
certifications than has the FISA Judge.
Id.
49. See Poole, supra note 44; Sloan, supra note 46, at 1496.
50. Under FISA, the Attorney General is required to submit an annual report to
Congress listing the number of FISA warrants requested, along with the number granted and
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otherwise, is allowed to appeal any order of the FISC.5 1
D. Ambiguities and Loopholes
In order to outline what seems to be a major flaw in the way FISA
was drafted, it is worthwhile to begin by making what may be a self-
evident observation: FISA only applies to acts of government surveillance.
That is to say, a prerequisite to trigger FISA's applicability to any
particular instance of government observation is that the observation must
fit FISA's definition of surveillance. If it does not, FISA is not implicated
and the government is free to listen as it wishes. 52 With the NSA's
increased use of data-mining technology, pattern-based inquiries, and
National Security Letters, FISA's definition of surveillance may be
antiquated to the point that it could render the entire statute irrelevant.
The definition of surveillance, in pertinent form, is the acquisition of
a communication either sent or received by a "particular, known United
States person who is in the United States," if the communication was
acquired by "intentionally targeting" that person, and if the circumstances
are such that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 53 Alternatively,
"surveillance" also means the acquisition of any communication to or from
someone located in the United States, if the acquisition occurs within the
United States.
54
It is clear from both FISA and Supreme Court precedent that an
individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy for "surveillance"
to occur. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that individuals
have no expectation of privacy in information held by a third party.55
Through the use of National Security Letters, the FBI and the NSA
routinely exploit this rule of law to acquire vast amounts of personal
information on U.S. citizens from private corporations, such as phone
companies and Internet service providers. 56 Because FISA's definition of
surveillance fails to account for this practice, the government is not
required to get a warrant or make any certification of probable cause.
Considering how much the technological capacity of the private sector for
gathering and retaining personal information has increased in recent years,
the privacy implications of government access to this data are huge.
the number denied. These reports are available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/.
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000) (granting the Court of Review "jurisdiction to review
the denial of [an application]; omits "granting of').
52. This is true provided that it complies with Title III and the Fourth Amendment.
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000).
54. 50 U.S.C. § 180 1(f)(2) (Supp. 112000).
55. See425 U.S. 435, 440, 442 (1976).
56. See Fred Cate, Government Data Mining and Access to Personal Information,
available at 829 PLIIPAT 467, 480 (2005).
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Recent "E-9 11" legislation, which requires all new cell phones in the
U.S. to be fitted with devices that continuously transmit the phone's
location, is an apt example.5 7 In the wake of this law, those who regularly
carry a cell phone now leave a digital trace everywhere they travel within a
matter of feet. If cellular carriers were to share their customer's data with
the NSA, CIA, or FBI, as has been widely alleged, those agencies could
easily tell not only to whom those customers talk, but with whom they
spend their time (assuming they have a cell phone as well), where they
spend their time, how long they are there, etc. All of this can potentially be
accomplished without doing any actual "surveillance."
Apart from the issue of private corporations gathering and sharing
intelligence, FISA's surveillance definition is antiquated due to the
distinction it makes between data acquired inside or outside of the U.S.
Again, government observation only qualifies as surveillance if the data is
acquired inside the U.S. or if one or more of the parties is a known U.S.
person, inside the U.S., who the government is targeting intentionally. In
other words, unrestrained and indiscriminate eavesdropping by the NSA is
allowed under FISA as long as the communication is not physically
intercepted within the U.S., and the target is either: (1) someone known to
be a non-U.S. person, (2) someone who is intentionally targeted but whose
identity is unknown, or (3) anyone else in the world who is not
intentionally being targeted.
Today, the requirement that the interception of electronic
communications takes place outside U.S. borders is hardly an obstacle to
intelligence agencies. The proliferation of the Internet and other global
communication networks has made physical distance and political borders
a nonfactor in the realm of communications. To increase efficiency,
Internet traffic is often routed through the least congested server regardless
of the server's physical location.58 For instance, two neighbors in Nebraska
chatting on an instant messenger program might have their communications
routed through servers in Hong Kong and back, despite being only 30 feet
apart.
The third caveat discussed above, the predicate requirement that an
individual be intentionally targeted in order to satisfy the definition of
surveillance, is likely to be the NSA's most useful loophole in the FISA
statute. As computing power has increased over the past 25 years, the U.S.
intelligence community has become capable of capturing and analyzing
huge amounts of data, beginning with no particular target of surveillance.
These "pattern based" searches rely on sophisticated models of criminal
57. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g)(1)(iv) (2005) (establishing the E-911 program).
58. See Overview of Cyberspace, http://faculty.frostburg.edu/cosc/htracy/cosclO0/
c&n;ooc/ooclOO.htm (last visited Feb. 15,2007); Sloan, supra note 46, at 1477-78.
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behavior with which to compare the captured data. 59
III. THE ECHELON INTERCEPTION SYSTEM
A. Overview and Capabilities
Project Echelon is the offspring of a classified pact known as
"UKUSA" between the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand. The pact was originally a post-World War II intelligence
sharing effort to counter Soviet aggression in Europe. While the United
States and Great Britain have refused to acknowledge its existence, the pact
was referred to in a U.K. parliamentary monitoring body report and has
been recognized by the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the former
Director of the Australian Defense Signals Directorate ("DSD"), who
admitted that the DSD "does cooperate with counterpart signals
intelligence organisations overseas under the UKUSA relationship."6 1
Since its inception, the treaty's signatories have worked together to
intercept, analyze, and share signals intelligence gathered from all of the
world's communication channels. 62 After the fall of the Soviet Union,
UKUSA member agencies quickly discovered that the cooperative nature
of their intelligence sharing pact was the most effective means of
combating modem global threats to national security. 6 3 Since September
11, 2001, international terrorism has unquestionably become the primary
focus of UKUSA's operations, and signals intelligence is considered to be
an invaluable tool in that effort.64 Former Deputy Director of the CIA and
Director of the NSA, General Marshall S. Carter, commented that signals
59. See Cate, supra note 56, at 484.
60. UKUSA is an acronym for United Kingdom-United States Security Agreement.
Kevin J. Lawner, Post-Sept. 11th International Surveillance Activity - A Failure of
Intelligence: The Echelon Interception System & the Fundamental Right to Privacy in
Europe, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 435, 444 (2002).
61. Letter from Martin Brady, Director, Defence Signals Directorate, to Ross Coulthart,
Reporter, Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd. 2 (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://sunday.nine
msn.com.au/sunday/images/cover/DSD_page2.gif. See also GERHARD SCHMID, REPORT ON
THE ExISTENCE OF A GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR THE INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL
COMMUNICATIONS (ECHELON INTERCEPTION SYSTEM), EUR. PARL. Doc. (A5-0264/2001)
62/194 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/prograni/process/rapport-echelonen.pd
f (citing to Martin Brady's letter as one evidentiary item that confirms the existence of the
ECHELON interception system) [hereinafter PARLIAMENT REPORT ON ECHELON].
62. See Lawner, supra note 60, at 444 (citing Duncan Campbell, Paper 1: Echelon and
its Role in COMINT, TELEPOLIS, May 27, 2001, paras. 15-17, available at http://www.heise.
de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/7747/l .html).
63. See id. at 445-46 (citing Duncan Campbell, Paper 2: COMINT Impact on
International Trade, TELEPOLIS, May 27, 2001, para. 3, available at http://www.heise.de/tp/
deutsch/special/ech/7752/l .html).
64. See id. at 446.
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intelligence has supplanted human intelligence in its value to policy
makers:
[Human Intelligence] is subject to all of the mental aberrations of the
source as well as the interpreter of the source... [Signals Intelligence]
has technical aberrations which give it away almost immediately if it
... is not legitimate. A good analyst can tell very, very quickly
whether this is an attempt at disinformat n, at confusion... . You
can't do that from [Human Intelligence]...
UKUSA member nations currently gather and share intelligence under the
treaty through a surveillance network known as Project Echelon. Put
simply, Echelon is understood to be the most powerful communications
surveillance project in history. It is in essence a global eavesdropping
system that targets key communications satellites and grounded networks
that convey phone calls, Internet, email, faxes, and telexes.66 The system is
capable of intercepting all radio and microwave communications as well.
67
It is believed that the NSA operates Project Echelon either in conjunction
with, or on behalf of, the remaining UKUSA signatories.68 As is the case
with the UKUSA agreement itself, the United States has never publicly
acknowledged the existence of Echelon, despite overwhelming evidence
that it exists.
69
What has been published on the project derives from congressional
and media investigations, Freedom of Information Act requests, the
testimony of former NSA ermployees, and a report published in July 2001
by the European Parliament. 7A 1996 book by New Zealand investigative
journalist Nicky Hager was the first to uncover New Zealand's
involvement in the UKUSA pact and provided the first comprehensive
details of Echelon. 7 1 Although there is evidence to suggest "Echelon" was
at one time a code word used to describe a network of computers that
processed communications after they were intercepted, today "Echelon" is
used generically and describes the entire network of computers, satellites,
cables, and other hardware that the UKUSA member nations use to
65. Sloan, supra note 46, at 1474 (citation omitted).
66. See id. at 1472 ("This worldwide network of COMINT programs is believed to
intercept all forms of global communication .... "); Erin L. Brown, ECHELON: The
National Security Agency's Compliance With Applicable Legal Guidelines in Light of the
Need for Tighter National Security, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 185, 187 (2003).
67. See Brown, supra note 66, at 187.
68. See Lawner, supra note 60, at 452 (citation omitted).
69. See id. at 452-53.
70. See PARLIAMENT REPORT ON ECHELON, supra note 61.
71. See Duncan Campbell, Making History: The Original Source for the 1988 First
Echelon Report Steps Forward, CRYPTOME, Feb. 25, 2000, http://cryptome.org/echelon-
mndc.htm.
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intercept and share signals intelligence. 72
Because it is highly classified, the exact scope of Echelon's
capabilities is unknown. However, based on what is known about the
computing power of a similar system used by the FBI,73 and in
consideration of the budget allotted to the NSA,74 the conclusion that
Echelon is an enormously powerful system seems to be inevitably correct.
After leading a congressional inquiry into the use of Echelon, Senator
Church (whose influence on the legal landscape is discussed supra, Part
II.A), warned:
[Its] capability at any time could be turned around on the American
people and no American would have any privacy left, such [is] the
capability to monitor everything.., it doesn't matter. There would be
no place to hide. [T]he technological capacity that the intelligence
community has given the government could enable A to impose total
tyranny.... Such is the capability of this technology.
Senator Church issued that statement in 1975, and it can only be assumed
that the technology he spoke of has evolved considerably in the past thirty
years.
Today, the common belief among researchers is that Echelon
intercepts and analyzes nearly three billion communications per day.
76
Some, however, believe that Echelon's capabilities go even further.
72. See Sloan, supra note 46, at 1470-71 (citing Elizabeth Becker, Long History of
Intercepting Key Words, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A6 ("It [the Echelon system] links
computers in at least seven sites around the world to receive, analyze, and sort information
captured from satellite communications, newly declassified information shows.")).
73. The FBI uses a similar signals interception system codenamed "Carnivore." For an
overview of the system and its capabilities, see lIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INDEPENDENT
TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/jmd/camivore draftl .pdf.
74. While the actual budget and size of the NSA are classified, the agency admits that if
it were considered a private corporation, it would rank in the top ten percent of Fortune 500
Companies in terms of dollars spent, floor space occupied, and personnel employed. See
Frequently Asked Questions - About National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/about/
about00018.cfm#7 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). Moreover, the NSA is the world's largest
employer of Ph.D mathematicians, as well as the world's largest owner of supercomputers.
The average electrical bill for NSA Headquarters in Maryland is estimated at twenty-one
million dollars. See Susan Page, NSA secret database report triggers fierce debate in
Washington, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/wash
ington/2006-05- 1l-nsa-reaxx.htm.
75. Sloan, supra note 46, at 1467 (citation omitted).
76. See NSA Watch: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Echelon,
http://www.nsawatch.org/echelonfaq.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Echelon
FAQ]; Brown, supra note 66, at 187; Echelon Watch, http://www.echelonwatch.org/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007) ("ECHELON attempts to capture staggering volumes of satellite,
microwave, cellular and fiber-optic traffic, including communications to and from North
America."). See also Echelon at AllExperts, http://experts.about.com/e/e/ec/echelon.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
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Former Georgia Congressman Bob Barr investigated the NSA while he was
a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee and Vice-Chairman of
the House Government Reform Committee.77 Barr is an outspoken critic of
the NSA and has commented that he believes that by now, Echelon has
attained the capability to intercept numerous electronic communications in
many countries around the world, no matter the point of origin or
destination.
78
The Echelon system connects supercomputers stationed at
approximately twenty bases throughout the world, all of which channel
intelligence through the project's headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.79
The stations are said to operate "'giant golf balls,"' called "radomes,"
which communicate with orbiting satellites to coordinate the interception of
communications all over the globe. The largest station in the network is
located in Menwith Hill, England, which is rumored to regularly intercept
enormous amounts of email, telephone, and fax communications going into
and out of Europe.8 1 As recently as 2002, communications giant British
Telecom publicly announced that it had wired three major domestic fiber-
optic trunk lines (each capable of simultaneously carrying over 100,000
calls) directly through Menwith Hill, "allow[ing] the N.S.A. . . . [free
access] to the heart of the British Telecomm network."82
All signals intelligence intercepted by Echelon is automatically routed
through a series of computers before it is disseminated to UKUSA's
intelligence agencies. Each member nation provides its own "dictionary "
which is essentially a list of terms to form the basis of Echelon's search.
The "terms" are not limited to spoken or written words, but can consist of
any number of permutations of words, phrases, pictures, voices, addresses,
phone numbers, etc.8 4 Each country maintains an independent dictionary,
and intelligence "hits" are sent directly to the respective agency without
77. See generally Bob Barr, http://www.bobbarr.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007)
(describing the politician's political and nonpolitical achievements and undertakings).
78. See Bob Barr, A Tyrant's Toolbox: Technology and Privacy in America, 26 J.
LEGIS. 71, 78 (2000) (stating that the scope of Echelon's interception abilities is unknown,
but that reports by the European Parliament suggest the system is capable of intercepting
numerous communications in Europe and other countries).
79. See Lawner, supra note 60, at 453 (citation omitted). See also PARLIAMENT REPORT
ON ECHELON, supra note 61.
80. See Lawner, supra note 60, at 453 (citation omitted). See also PARLIAMENT REPORT
ON ECHELON, supra note 61.
81. See Lawner, supra note 60, at 453 (citation omitted).
82. See id.
83. See Sloan, supra note 46, at 1480-81 (citation omitted); Douglas C. McNabb &
Mathew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, The President, And The NSA: National Security Agency
Intercepts Within The United States, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 15.
84. See Echelon FAQ, supra note 76.
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being seen by any of the other agencies.85 The membership will then share
intelligence at its discretion and in accordance with its own laws.
B. Interaction with Foreign Intelligence Legal Regime
1. Shared and Incidentally Obtained Information
Executive Order 12,333 authorizes the NSA to collect and
disseminate any "[i]ncidentally obtained information that may indicate
involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local, or foreign
laws . .. .86 This license is another example of the fundamental conflict
that has resulted from Congress' attempts to control the NSA's new
generation of unfocused and automated data mining programs using a
statute that was designed to regulate traditional, target-specific
surveillance.
Although the concept of using incidentally acquired information is
not intuitively problematic, the sheer enormity of Echelon's surveillance
capacity means the exception could potentially swallow the entire rule. A
system that is essentially capable of intercepting every communication in
the world could conceivably allow the government to thereby "incidentally
acquire" all of those communications. If and when the government attains
such a capability, FISA and the Fourth Amendment will be circumvented,
and Americans will no longer have any statutory or constitutional
protection of their privacy in the sphere of foreign intelligence surveillance.
Another issue arises from the fact that Executive Order 12,333 allows
U.S. government agencies to accept intelligence about U.S. citizens
acquired by foreign governments, regardless of how the information was
obtained. Given the secrecy and collaboration that takes place in the
UKUSA security agreement, the concern is that the NSA is side-stepping
FISA by simply allowing a foreign government to spy on U.S. citizens and
then freely sharing in the resulting intelligence. Although Executive Order
12,333 forbids the NSA from actively soliciting a foreign agency to
conduct surveillance that the NSA could not conduct on its own, there is
evidence that the rule enjoys very little fidelity. Even assuming that the
NSA strictly adheres to Executive Order 12,333 and accepts and shares
intelligence only in good faith, the synergistic nature of the UKUSA pact
may make the practice of intelligence sharing within the pact
unconstitutional. A more detailed analysis of this idea is provided in the
next section.
85. See id.
86. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 34, at pt. 2.3(i).
87. Id. at pt. 2.12.
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A noteworthy example of the potential for abuse in UKUSA came
from former Canadian Intelligence Agent Mike Frost, who admitted to the
BBC that he utilized Echelon to spy on two British Cabinet members at the
behest of former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 88 He claimed she
ordered the surveillance because she suspected the cabinet members
"weren't onside." 89 Frost clarified that the use of the term "onside" meant
that the targets disagreed with her on policy matters but were not under
suspicion of espionage. 90 In a reference to the UKUSA pact, Frost
commented, "The British Parliament 9had] total deniability... They didn't
do anything... we did it for them." Frost claimed that all five member
nations used Echelon and the UKUSA pact to skirt domestic privacy
laws.
92
In a later interview with CBS News, Frost commented, "I was trained
by you guys [the NSA]". And although admitting that widespread
surveillance was necessary, Frost added, "My concern is no accountability
and nothing, no safety net in place for the innocent people who fall through
the cracks." 93 For example, Frost recalled an incident where a Canadian
housewife was put on a terrorist watch list after she mentioned in a phone
call that her son had "'bombed' in the play last night."
'94
Several ex-NSA employees claim that Echelon is often used to spy on
civilian organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace.
95
According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the NSA was
involved in "clandestine service applications" including surveillance and
"surreptitious entry" into the homes of journalists who attempted to
investigate Echelon.96 Also, an ex-analyst at Echelon's Menwith Hill
station admits to eavesdropping on the phone calls of ex-Senator Strom
Thurmond. 97
Perhaps even more disturbing than allegations of the U.S. government
spying on its own citizens is the fact that Echelon's dissemination
88. Thatcher 'spied on ministers', BBCNEws, Feb. 25, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/uk_politics/ 655996.stm.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ex-Snoop Confirms Echelon Network, CBS NEWS, Mar. 1, 2000, available at http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/02/24/60minutes/main 164651 .shtml.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Lawner, supra note 60, at 455; PARLIAMENT REPORT ON ECHELON, supra note 61,
at 71.
96. Plaintiffs Complaint at 44, ACLU v. NSA and CSS, (E.D. Mich. 2006), available
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/23491 lg120060117.html.
97. PARLIAMENT REPORT ON ECHELON, supra note 61, at 71.
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procedure creates the bizarre possibility that foreign intelligence agencies
are using NSA technology and resources to spy on American citizens, and
the NSA (at least in theory) has no immediate access to the information or
control over its distribution to foreign intelligence agencies.
2. Information Sharing and the Fourth Amendment
U.S. Constitutional law has always recognized a distinction between
intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing. The central difference
between the two is that intelligence gathering (the central thesis of this
Note notwithstanding) is typically limited by statutory and constitutional
requirements, where intelligence sharing typically is not. If a foreign
intelligence agency wishes to provide the U.S. government with
information, the government is generally free to accept it. The only
limitation is that the foreign agency must have been acting on its own
accord and not at the behest of the U.S. government. The following is a
brief overview of the exclusionary rule and an argument of why it should
apply to information freely handed to the U.S. government by foreign
intelligence agencies.
It is a well established canon of constitutional law that when a state
acts as the agent of the federal government, or as part of a joint venture
with the federal government, the actions of the state will be attributed to the
federal government for constitutional analysis. This doctrine does not
apply to foreign governments. Under current law, information furnished to
American officials by foreign intelligence agencies is not subject to the
exclusionary rule, even in those cases where the surveillance was done in
violation of the U.S. Constitution.
99
The Supreme Court's decision in Lustig v. United States, in which
Justice Frankfurter first articulated what would become known as the
"silver platter" doctrine, set forth the initial precedent in this area.100 Under
the doctrine, the question of whether the government has participated in
intelligence gathering or intelligence sharing is fact specific and turns not
on the constitutionality of the search itself, but rather to the extent of the
government's involvement. According to Frankfurter, "[t]he crux of that
doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in
it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state
98. See Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1927) (holding that in
making a search and seizure, state officers were acting solely on behalf of the United States,
and evidence thus obtained is inadmissible in a prosecution in a federal court if the
circumstances of the search and seizure were such as to render it lawful).
99. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding exclusionary
rule does not require suppression of evidence seized by foreign police agents).
100. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."''
1
Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Lustig was heavily criticized
and would eventually be explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in its
decision in Elkins v. United States.102 The Elkins Court held for the first
time that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
inadmissible in federal courts regardless of whether the offending officer
was a state or federal employee. Later, the Court's ruling in Mapp v. Ohio
destroyed the remainder of the silver platter doctrine by establishing the
rule that constitutionally tainted evidence will consistently be excluded in
both state and federal courts.
10 3
Although Mapp did not involve electronic surveillance and did not
contemplate actions of foreign governments, its commentary on the scope
of the Fourth Amendment is pertinent. The clear holding of Mapp is that
evidence illegally obtained by the U.S. government should not be
admissible in any American court. The reason for the exclusion of such
evidence is to deter government officials from conduct which violates the
Constitution.
With that in mind, the logical retort to the suggestion that the
exclusionary rule should apply to evidence obtained by foreign
governments is that a foreign government is not under the purview of the
U.S. Constitution, so it cannot be deterred. Many courts agree with this
logic. In Brulay v. United States, the Ninth Circuit ruled that neither the
Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to exclude evidence
seized by Mexican officials who were not "acting at instigation of United
States customs or narcotic officials," because "[n]either the Fourth nor the
Fourteenth Amendments are directed at Mexican officials and no
prophylactic purpose is served by applying an exclusionary rule here since
what we do will not alter the search policies of the sovereign Nation of
Mexico." 1 0 4
Although the Ninth Circuit's ruling in and of itself is not necessarily
at odds with the thesis of this Note, its essential reasoning assuredly is.
Because Brulay was arrested in Mexico, he was not under the umbrella of
the Constitution at the time his privacy was invaded, and any expectation of
privacy he had would rightfully have been diminished. This is not the case
when foreign intelligence agencies acquire signals intelligence from U.S.
citizens inside the U.S. and subsequently share it with the FBI or NSA. In
101. Id. at 78-79.
102. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
103. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (holding all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal
trial in a state court).
104. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
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consideration of this, analysis of the Brulay decision is provided not for its
significance in the field of privacy law, but rather as an anecdote
highlighting a fundamental misconception about the exclusionary rule,
particularly as it applies to the Fourth Amendment.
The interpretation of the exclusionary rule followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Brulay is misguided in both its substantive understanding of the
law and its assumptions about the exclusionary rule's real-world deterrent
effect. To begin, the Brulay Court incorrectly concludes that the primary
goal of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of U.S. official misconduct.
While the function of the exclusionary rule may be to deter police from
violating the Fourth Amendment, logically that function is only useful to
the extent that it protects a liberty that society values. Put differently, the
exclusionary rule exists because Americans value privacy, not because
Americans value the Fourth Amendment. According to Justice Silas Clark,
"were it otherwise... the [Fourth Amendment] would be a 'form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties.., neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with []
freedom.. "105
In addition, the Brulay Court's characterization of the practical effect
of the exclusionary rule is flawed. The Court assumes that the investigation
techniques used by foreign officials are guided solely by the sovereign
authority of their respective nations. In other words, our law does not
govern them, so they have no incentive to follow it. This assumption
ignores considerations of efficiency and the end-goals of surveillance.
Admittedly, foreign officials do not operate under the threat of
consequences for violating U.S. laws as U.S. officials do. Nevertheless, the
threat of repercussions is not the sole, or even primary, reason U.S. law
enforcement agents respect the Constitution. The exclusionary rule deters
U.S. officials not because it is "the law" in the abstract, but rather because
officials know that if they violate the Fourth Amendment, their work will
be wasted and the suspect will go free. In that sense, there is no reason to
think the exclusionary rule would not have the same deterrent effect on a
foreign official as it does on an agent of the U.S.
A foreign agency conducting electronic surveillance on an American
citizen, for the purposes of sharing intelligence with the U.S. government,
would have precisely the same motivation to ensure that the evidence it
gathers is admissible in a U.S. court. Even if the foreign government has no
actual interest in the investigation, the logic would translate assuming that
intelligence sharing is a reciprocal act among nations that is intended to aid
in prosecution.
105. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Echelon Interception System has been described as an effort to
do away with formal borders in the intelligence community. 106 If FISA and
the Fourth Amendment are to provide meaningful protection to Americans
in this new community, their application (to the extent possible) must also
become global. To that end, the government's practice of accepting and
utilizing intelligence provided by foreign agencies against Americans must
be subject to the common law exclusionary rule. When the government
accepts the surveillance product of foreign intelligence agencies, regardless
of whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated, it is tacitly (if not overtly)
encouraging a foreign government to violate the privacy rights of
Americans. In the context of Echelon and the UKUSA intelligence sharing
pact, the failure to apply the exclusionary rule to shared evidence is
tantamount to recognizing a conceptual right to privacy, but in reality
withholding the freedom and enjoyment it provides.
In the statutory realm, the fact that the FISC is essentially immune
from meaningful scrutiny makes the current version of FISA uniquely
threatening to the privacy rights of Americans. If the interests of national
security require that the judgment of FISA warrant applications be done
outside of the public eye, then the process should at least be adversarial.
Congress may wish to consider appointing a special advocate, with the
highest security clearance, whose job it would be to represent the privacy
interests of potential FISA surveillance targets. Having a third voice in the
room, even if it does not affect a single decision of the court, would help
alleviate the public anxiety that naturally arises with the existence of secret
courts, sealed decisions, and unexpressed law.
Unfortunately, the United States' current use of Echelon and the
UKUSA pact to circumvent its own laws is both distressing and anti-
democratic. While the marginalization of privacy rights in a post-
September 11 th America may have been inevitable, the same should not be
said about the rule of law. The agencies charged with ensuring the security
of America must be allowed to zealously fight terrorism with all of the
tools and techniques at their disposal. However, if privacy is a luxury
Americans can no longer afford, its death knell should be legislated and
documented in a manner consistent with open government. And if the U.S.
is to remain committed to open government, our laws must reflect the line
that our elected leaders draw between the interests of liberty and security,
regardless of where they choose to draw it.
106. McNabb & McNabb, supra note 83, at 15.
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